I have called this lecture the “Christian and Oriental” philosophy of art because we are considering a catholic or universal doctrine, with which the humanistic philosophies of art can neither be compared nor reconciled, but only contrasted; and “True” philosophy both because of its authority and because of its consistency. It will not be out of place to say that I believe what I have to expound: for the study of any subject can live only to the extent that the student himself stands or falls by the life of the subject studied; the interdependence of faith and understanding applying as much to the theory of art as to any other doctrine. In the text of what follows I shall not distinguish Christian from Oriental, nor cite authorities by chapter and verse: I have done this elsewhere, and am hardly afraid that anyone will imagine that I am propounding any views that I regard as my own except in the sense that I have made them my own. It is not the personal view of anyone that I shall try to explain, but that doctrine of art which is intrinsic to the Philosophia Perennis and can be recognized wherever it has not been forgotten that “culture” originates in work and not in play. If I use the language of Scholasticism rather than a Sanskrit vocabulary, it is because I am talking English, and must use that kind of English in which ideas can be clearly expressed.

Man’s activity consists in either a making or a doing. Both of these aspects of the active life depend for their correction upon the contemplative life. The making of things is governed by art, the doing of things by prudence. An absolute distinction of art from prudence is made for purposes of logical understanding: but while we make this distinction, we must not forget that the man is a whole man, and cannot be justified as such merely by what he makes; the artist works “by art and willingly.”

Even supposing that he avoids artistic sin, it is still essential to him as a man to have had a right will, and so to have avoided moral sin. We cannot absolve the artist from this moral responsibility by laying it upon the patron, or only if the artist be in some way compelled; for the artist is normally either his own patron, deciding what is to be made, or formally and freely consents to the will of the patron, which becomes his
own as soon as the commission has been accepted, after which the artist is only concerned with the good of the work to be done: if any other motive affects him in his work he has no longer any proper place in the social order. Manufacture is for use and not for profit. The artist is not a special kind of man, but every man who is not an artist in some field, every man without a vocation, is an idler. The kind of artist that a man should be, carpenter, painter, lawyer, farmer or priest, is determined by his own nature, in other words by his nativity. The only man who has a right to abstain from all constructive activities is the monk who has also surrendered all those uses that depend on things that can be made and is no longer a member of society. No man has a right to any social status who is not an artist.

We are thus introduced at the outset to the problem of the use of art and the worth of the artist to a serious society. This use is in general the good of man, the good of society, and in particular the occasional good of an individual requirement. All of these goods correspond to the desires of men: so that what is actually made in a given society is a key to the governing conception of the purpose of life in that society, which can be judged by its works in that sense, and better than in any other way. There can be no doubt about the purpose of art in a traditional society: when it has been decided that such and such a thing should be made, it is by art that it can be properly made. There can be no good use without art: that is, no good use if things are not properly made. The artist is producing a utility, something to be used. Mere pleasure is not a use from this point of view. An illustration can be given in our taste for Shaker or other simple furniture, or for Chinese bronzes or other abstract arts of exotic origin, which are not foods but sauces to our palate.

Our “aesthetic” appreciation, essentially sentimental because it is just what the word “aesthetic” means, a kind of feeling rather than an understanding, has little or nothing to do with their raison d’être. If they please our taste and are fashionable, this only means that we have over-eaten of other foods, not that we are such as those who made these things and made “good use” of them. To “enjoy” what does not correspond to any vital needs of our own and what we have not verified in our own life can only be described as an indulgence. It is luxurious to make mantelpiece ornaments of the artifacts of what we term uncivilized or superstitious peoples, whose culture we think of as much inferior to our own, and which our touch has destroyed: the attitude, however ignorant, of those who used to call these things “abominations” and “beastly devices of the heathen,” was a much healthier one. It is the same if we read the scriptures of any tradition, or authors such as Dante or Ashvaghosha who tell us frankly that they wrote with other than “aesthetic” ends in view; or
if we listen to sacrificial music for the ears’ sake only. We have a right to be pleased by these things only through our understanding use of them. We have goods enough of our own “perceptible to the senses”: if the nature of our civilization be such that we lack a sufficiency of “intelligible goods,” we had better remake ourselves than divert the intelligible goods of others to the multiplication of our own aesthetic satisfactions.

In the philosophy that we are considering, only the contemplative and active lives are reckoned human. The life of pleasure only, one of which the end is pleasure, is subhuman; every animal “knows what it likes,” and seeks for it. This is not an exclusion of pleasure from life as if pleasure were wrong in itself, it is an exclusion of the pursuit of pleasure thought of as a “diversion,” and apart from “life.” It is in life itself, in “proper operation,” that pleasure arises naturally, and this very pleasure is said to “perfect the operation” itself. In the same way in the case of the pleasures of use or the understanding of use.

We need hardly say that from the traditional point of view there could hardly be found a stronger condemnation of the present social order than in the fact that the man at work is no longer doing what he likes best, but rather what he must, and in the general belief that a man can only be really happy when he “gets away” and is at play. For even if we mean by “happy” to enjoy the “higher things of life,” it is a cruel error to pretend that this can be done at leisure if it has not been done at work. For “the man devoted to his own vocation finds perfection. . . . That man whose prayer and praise of God are in the doing of his own work perfects himself.” It is this way of life that our civilization denies to the vast majority of men, and in this respect that it is notably inferior to even the most primitive or savage societies with which it can be contrasted.

Manufacture, the practice of an art, is thus not only the production of utilities but in the highest possible sense the education of men. It can never be, unless for the sentimentalist who lives for pleasure, an “art for art’s sake,” that is to say a production of “fine” or useless objects only that we may be delighted by “fine colors and sounds”; neither can we speak of our traditional art as a “decorative” art, for to think of decoration as its essence would be the same as to think of millinery as the essence of costume or of upholstery as the essence of furniture. The greater part of our boasted “love of art” is nothing but the enjoyment of comfortable feelings. One had better be an artist than go about “loving art”: just as one had better be a botanist than go about “loving the pines.”

In our traditional view of art, in folk-art, Christian and Oriental art, there is no essential distinction of a fine and useless art from a utilitarian craftsmanship. There is no distinction in principle of orator from carpenter, but only a distinction of things well and truly made from things
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not so made and of what is beautiful from what is ugly in terms of formality and informality. But, you may object, do not some things serve the uses of the spirit or intellect, and others those of the body; is not a symphony nobler than a bomb, an icon than a fireplace? Let us first of all beware of confusing art with ethics. “Noble” is an ethical value, and pertains to the a priori censorship of what ought or ought not to be made at all. The judgment of works of art from this point of view is not merely legitimate, but essential to a good life and the welfare of humanity. But it is not a judgment of the work of art as such. The bomb, for example, is only bad as a work of art if it fails to destroy and kill to the required extent. The distinction of artistic from moral sin which is so sharply drawn in Christian philosophy can be recognized again in Confucius, who speaks of a Succession Dance as being “at the same time perfect beauty and perfect goodness,” and of the War Dance as being “perfect beauty but not perfect goodness.”12 It will be obvious that there can be no moral judgment of art itself, since it is not an act but a kind of knowledge or power by which things can be well made, whether for good or evil use: the art by which utilities are produced cannot be judged morally, because it is not a kind of willing but a kind of knowing.

Beauty in this philosophy is the attractive power of perfection.13 There are perfections or beauties of different kinds of things or in different contexts, but we cannot arrange these beauties in a hierarchy, as we can the things themselves: we can no more say that a cathedral as such is “better” than a barn as such than we can say that a rose as such is “better” than a skunk cabbage as such; each is beautiful to the extent that it is what it purports to be, and in the same proportion good.14 To say that a perfect cathedral is a greater work of art than a perfect barn is either to assume that there can be degrees of perfection, or to assume that the artist who made the barn was really trying to make a cathedral. We see that this is absurd; and yet it is just in this way that whoever believes that art “progresses” contrasts the most primitive with the most advanced (or decadent) styles of art, as though the primitive had been trying to do what we try to do, and had drawn like that while really trying to draw as we draw; and that is to impute artistic sin to the primitive (any sin being defined as a departure from the order to the end). So far from this, the only test of excellence in a work of art is the measure of the artist’s actual success in making what was intended.

One of the most important implications of this position is that beauty is objective, residing in the artifact and not in the spectator, who may or may not be qualified to recognize it.15 The work of art is good of its kind, or not good at all; its excellence is as independent of our reactions to its aesthetic surfaces as it is of our moral reaction to its thesis.
Just as the artist conceives the form of the thing to be made only after he has consented to the patron's will, so we, if we are to judge as the artist could, must already have consented to the existence of the object before we can be free to compare its actual shape with its prototype in the artist. We must not condescend to “primitive” works by saying “That was before they knew anything about anatomy, or perspective,” or call their work “unnatural” because of its formality: we must have learnt that these primitives did not feel our kind of interest in anatomy, nor intend to tell us what things are like; we must have learnt that it is because they had something definite to say that their art is more abstract, more intellectual, and less than our own a matter of mere reminiscence or emotion. If the medieval artist's constructions corresponded to a certain way of thinking, it is certain that we cannot understand them except to the extent that we can identify ourselves with this way of thinking. “The greater the ignorance of modern times, the deeper grows the darkness of the Middle Ages.” The Middle Ages and the East are mysterious to us only because we know, not what to think, but what we like to think. As humanists and individualists it flatters us to think that art is an expression of personal feelings and sentiments, preference and free choice, unfettered by the sciences of mathematics and cosmology. But medieval art was not like ours “free” to ignore truth. For them, *Ars sine scientia nihil:* by “science,” we mean of course, the reference of all particulars to unifying principles, not the “laws” of statistical prediction.

The perfection of the object is something of which the critic cannot judge, its beauty something that he cannot feel, if he has not like the original artist made himself such as the thing itself should be; it is in this way that “criticism is reproduction,” and “judgment the perfection of art.” The “appreciation of art” must not be confused with a psychoanalysis of our likes and dislikes, dignified by the name of “aesthetic reactions”: “aesthetic pathology is an excrescence upon a genuine interest in art which seems to be peculiar to civilized peoples.” The study of art, if it is to have any cultural value will demand two far more difficult operations than this, in the first place an understanding and acceptance of the whole point of view from which the necessity for the work arose, and in the second place a bringing to life in ourselves of the form in which the artist conceived the work and by which he judged it. The student of art, if he is to do more than accumulate facts, must also sacrifice himself: the wider the scope of his study in time and space, the more must he cease to be a provincial, the more he must universalize himself, whatever may be his own temperament and training. He must assimilate whole cultures that seem strange to him, and must also be able to elevate his own levels of reference from those of observation to that of the vision of ideal
forms. He must rather love than be curious about the subject of his study. It is just because so much is demanded that the study of “art” can have a cultural value, that is to say may become a means of growth. How often our college courses require of the student much less than this!

A need, or “indigence” as Plato calls it, is thus the first cause of the production of a work of art. We spoke of spiritual and physical needs, and said that works of art could not be classified accordingly. If this is difficult for us to admit, it is because we have forgotten what we are, what “man” in this philosophy denotes, a spiritual as well as a psycho-physical being. We are therefore well contented with a functional art, good of its kind insofar as goodness does not interfere with profitable saleability, and can hardly understand how things to be used can also have a meaning. It is true that what we have come to understand by “man,” viz., “the reasoning and mortal animal,”19 can live by “bread alone,” and that bread alone, make no mistake about it, is therefore a good; to function is the very least that can be expected of any work of art. “Bread alone” is the same thing as a “merely functional art.” But when it is said that man does not live by bread alone but “by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God,”20 it is the whole man that is meant. The “words of God” are precisely those ideas and principles that can be expressed whether verbally or visually by art; the words or visual forms in which they are expressed are not merely sensible but also significant. To separate as we do the functional from the significant art, applied from a so-called fine art, is to require of the vast majority of men to live by the merely functional art, a “bread alone” that is nothing but the “husks that the swine did eat.” The insincerity and inconsistency of the whole position is to be seen in the fact that we do not expect of the “significant” art that it be significant of anything, nor from the “fine” art anything but an “aesthetic” pleasure; if the artist himself declares that his work is charged with meaning and exists for the sake of this meaning, we call it an irrelevance, but decide that he may have been an artist in spite of it.21 In other words, if the merely functional arts are the husks, the fine arts are the tinsel of life, and art for us has no significance whatever.

Primitive man, despite the pressure of his struggle for existence, knew nothing of such merely functional arts. The whole man is naturally a metaphysician, and only later on a philosopher and psychologist, a systematist. His reasoning is by analogy, or in other words by means of an “adequate symbolism.” As a person rather than an animal he knows immortal through mortal things.22

That the “invisible things of God” (that is to say, the ideas or eternal reasons of things, by which we know what they ought to be like) are to be seen in “the things that are made”23 applied for him not only to the
things that God had made but to those that he made himself. He could not have thought of meaning as something that might or might not be added to useful objects at will. Primitive man made no real distinction of sacred from secular: his weapons, clothing, vehicles and house were all of them imitations of divine prototypes, and were to him even more what they meant than what they were in themselves; he made them this “more” by incantation and by rites. Thus he fought with thunderbolts, put on celestial garments, rode in a chariot of fire, saw in his roof the starry sky, and in himself more than “this man” So-and-so. All these things belonged to the “Lesser Mysteries” of the crafts, and to the knowledge of “Companions.” Nothing of it remains to us but the transformation of the bread in sacrificial rites, and in the reference to its prototype of the honor paid to an icon.

The Indian actor prepares for his performance by prayer. The Indian architect is often spoken of as visiting heaven and there making notes of the prevailing forms of architecture, which he imitates here below. All traditional architecture, in fact, follows a cosmic pattern? Those who think of their house as only a “machine to live in” should judge their point of view by that of Neolithic man, who also lived in a house, but a house that embodied a cosmology. We are more than sufficiently provided with overheating systems: we should have found his house uncomfortable; but let us not forget that he identified the column of smoke that rose from his hearth to disappear from view through a hole in the roof with the Axis of the Universe, saw in this luffer an image of the Heavenly Door, and in his hearth the Navel of the Earth, formulae that we at the present day are hardly capable of understanding; we, for whom “such knowledge as is not empirical is meaningless.” Most of the things that Plato called “ideas” are only “superstitions” to us.

To have seen in his artifacts nothing but the things themselves, and in the myth a mere anecdote would have been a mortal sin, for this would have been the same as to see in oneself nothing but the “reasoning and mortal animal,” to recognize only “this man,” and never the “form of humanity.” It is just insofar as we do now see only the things as they are in themselves, and only ourselves as we are in ourselves, that we have killed the metaphysical man and shut ourselves up in the dismal cave of functional and economic determinism. Do you begin to see now what I meant by saying that works of art consistent with the Philosophia Perennis cannot be divided into the categories of the utilitarian and the spiritual, but pertain to both worlds, functional and significant, physical and metaphysical?
The artist has now accepted his commission and is expected to practice his art. It is by this art that he knows both what the thing should be like, and how to impress this form upon the available material, so that it may be informed with what is actually alive in himself. His operation will be twofold, “free” and “servile,” theoretical and operative, inventive and imitative. It is in terms of the freely invented formal cause that we can best explain how the pattern of the thing to be made or arranged, this essay or this house for example, is known. It is this cause by which the actual shape of the thing can best be understood; because “similitude is with respect to the form” of the thing to be made, and not with respect to the shape or appearance of some other and already existing thing: so that in saying “imitative” we are by no means saying “naturalistic.” “Art imitates nature in her manner of operation,” that is to say God in his manner of creation, in which he does not repeat himself or exhibit deceptive illusions in which the species of things are confused.

How is the form of the thing to be made evoked? This is the kernel of our doctrine, and the answer can be made in a great many different ways. The art of God is the Son “through whom all things are made”; in the same way the art in the human artist is his child through which some one thing is to be made. The intuition-expression of an imitable form is an intellectual conception born of the artist’s wisdom, just as the eternal reasons are born of the Eternal Wisdom. The image arises naturally in his spirit, not by way of an aimless inspiration, but in purposeful and vital operation, “by a word conceived in intellect.” It is this filial image, and not a retinal reflection or the memory of a retinal reflection, that he imitates in the material, just as at the creation of the world “God’s will beheld that beauteous world and imitated it,” that is to say impressed on primary matter a “world-picture” already “painted by the spirit on the canvas of the spirit.” All things are to be seen in this eternal mirror better than in any other way: for there the artist’s models are all alive and more alive than those that are posed when we are taught in schools of art to draw “from life.” If shapes of natural origin often enter into the artist’s compositions, this does not mean that they pertain to his art, but they are the material in which the form is clothed; just as the poet uses sounds, which are not his thesis, but only means. The artist’s spirals are the forms of life, and not only of this or that life; the form of the crosier was not suggested by that of a fern frond. The superficial resemblances of art to “nature” are accidental; and when they are deliberately sought, the art is already in its anecdotage. It is not by the looks of existing things, but as Augustine says, by their ideas, that we know what we proposed to make should be like. He who does not
see more vividly and clearly than this perishing mortal eye can see, does not see creatively at all;37 “The city can never otherwise be happy unless it is drawn by those painters who follow a divine original."38

What do we mean by “invention”? The entertainment of ideas; the intuition of things as they are on higher than empirical levels of reference. We must digress to explain that in using the terms intuition and expression as the equivalents of conception or generation, we are not thinking either of Bergson or of Croce. By “intuition” we mean with Augustine an intellection extending beyond the range of dialectic to that of the eternal reasons39—a contemplation, therefore, rather than a thinking: by “expression” we mean with Bonaventura a begotten rather than a calculated likeness.40

It may be asked, How can the artist's primary act of imagination be spoken of as “free” if in fact he is working to some formula, specification or iconographic prescription, or even drawing from nature? If in fact a man is blindly copying a shape defined in words or already visibly existing, he is not a free agent, but only performing a servile operation. This is the case in quantitative production; here the craftsman's work, however skilful, can be called mechanical rather than artistic, and it is only in this sense that the phrase “mere craftsmanship” acquired a meaning. It would be the same with the performance of any rite,41 to the extent that performance becomes a habit, unenlivened by any recollection. The mechanical product may still be a work of art: but the art was not the workman's, nor the workman an artist, but a hireling; and this is one of the many ways in which an “Industry without art is brutality.”

The artist's theoretical or imaginative act is said to be “free” because it is not assumed or admitted that he is blindly copying any model extrinsic to himself, but expressing himself, even in adhering to a prescription or responding to requirements that may remain essentially the same for millennia. It is true that to be properly expressed a thing must proceed from within, moved by its form:42 and yet it is not true that in practicing an art that has “fixed ends and ascertained means of operation”43 the artist's freedom is denied; it is only the academician and the hireling whose work is under constraint. It is true that if the artist has not conformed himself to the pattern of the thing to be made he has not really known it and cannot work originally.44 But if he has thus conformed himself he will be in fact expressing himself in bringing it forth.45 Not indeed expressing his “personality,” himself as “this man” So-and-so, but himself sub specie aeternitatis, and apart from individual idiosyncrasy. The idea of the thing to be made is brought to life in him, and it will be from this supra-individual life of the artist himself that the vitality of the finished work will be derived.46 “It is not the tongue, but our very life that sings the new song.”47 In this way too the human
operation reflects the manner of operation in divinis: “All things that were made were life in Him.”

“Through the mouth of Hermes the divine Eros began to speak.”

We must not conclude from the form of the words that the artist is a passive instrument, like a stenographer. “He” is much rather actively and consciously making use of “himself” as an instrument. Body and mind are not the man, but only his instrument and vehicle. The man is passive only when he identifies himself with the psychophysical ego letting it take him where it will: but in act when he directs it. Inspiration and aspiration are not exclusive alternatives, but one and the same; because the spirit to which both words refer cannot work in the man except to the extent that he is “in the spirit.” It is only when the form of the thing to be made has been known that the artist returns to “himself,” performing the servile operation with good will, a will directed solely to the good of the thing to be made. He is willing to make “what was shown him upon the Mount.” The man incapable of contemplation cannot be an artist, but only a skillful workman; it is demanded of the artist to be both a contemplative and a good workman. Best of all if, like the angels, he need not in his activity “lose the delights of inward contemplation.”

What is implied by contemplation is to raise our level of reference from the empirical to the ideal, from observation to vision, from any auditory sensation to audition; the imager (or worshiper, for no distinction can be made here) “taking ideal form under the action of the vision, while remaining only potentially ‘himself.’”

“I am one,” says Dante, accounting for his dolce stil nuovo, “who when Love inspires me take note, and go setting it forth in such wise as He dictates within me.” “Lo, make all things in accordance with the pattern that was shown thee on the mount.” It is in imitation of angelic works of art that any work of art is wrought here.

It is in agreement with these traditional dicta that Blake equated with Christianity itself “the divine arts of imagination” and asked “Is the Holy Ghost any other than an intellectual fountain?” and that Emerson said, “The intellect searches out the absolute order of things as they stand in the mind of God, and without the colors of affection.” Where we see “genius” as a peculiarly developed “personality” to be exploited, traditional philosophy sees the immanent Spirit, beside which the individual personality is relatively nil: “Thou madest,” as Augustine says, “that ingenium whereby the artificer may take his art, and may see within what he has to do without.” It is the light of this Spirit that becomes “the light of a mechanical art.” What Augustine calls ingenium corresponds to Philo’s Hegemon, the Sanskrit “Inner Controller,” and to what is called in medi-
eval theology the Synteresis, the immanent Spirit thought of equally as an artistic, moral and speculative conscience, both as we use the word and in its older sense of “consciousness.” Augustine’s *ingenium* corresponds to Greek *daimon*, but not to what we mean today by “genius.” No man, considered as So-and-so, can be a genius: but all men have a genius, to be served or disobeyed at their own peril. There can be no property in ideas, because these are gifts of the Spirit, and not to be confused with talents: ideas are never made, but can only be “invented,” that is “found,” and entertained. No matter how many times they may already have been “applied” by others, whoever conforms himself to an idea and so makes it his own, will be working originally, but not so if he is expressing only his own ideals or opinions.

To “think for oneself” is always to think of oneself; what is called “free thought” is therefore the natural expression of a humanistic philosophy. We are at the mercy of our thoughts and corresponding desires. Free thought is a passion; it is much rather the thoughts than ourselves that are free. We cannot too much emphasize that contemplation is not a passion but an act: and that where modern psychology sees in “inspiration” the uprush of an instinctive and subconscious will, the orthodox philosophy sees an elevation of the artist’s being to superconscious and supra-individual levels. Where the psychologist invokes a demon, the metaphysician invokes a daemon: what is for the one the “libido” is for the other “the divine Eros.”

There is also a sense in which the man as an individual “expresses himself,” whether he will or no. This is inevitable, only because nothing can be known or done except in accordance with the mode of the knower. So the man himself, as he is in himself, appears in style and handling, and can be recognized accordingly. The uses and significance of works of art may remain the same for millennia, and yet we can often date and place a work at first glance. Human idiosyncrasy is thus the explanation of style and of stylistic sequences: “style is the man.” Styles are the basis of our histories of art, which are written like other histories to flatter our human vanity. But the artist whom we have in view is innocent of history and unaware of the existence of stylistic sequences. Styles are the accident and by no means the essence of art; the free man is not trying to express himself, but that which was to be expressed. Our conception of art as essentially the expression of a personality, our whole view of genius, our impertinent curiosities about the artist’s private life, all these things are the products of a perverted individualism and prevent our understanding of the nature of medieval and oriental art. The modern mania for attribution is the expression of Renaissance conceit
and nineteenth century humanism; it has nothing to do with the nature of medieval art, and becomes a pathetic fallacy when applied to it.\textsuperscript{57}

In all respects the traditional artist devotes himself to the good of the work to be done.\textsuperscript{57a} The operation is a rite, the celebrant neither intentionally nor even consciously expressing himself. It is by no accident of time, but in accordance with a governing concept of the meaning of life, of which the goal is implied in St. Paul’s \textit{Vivo autem jam non ego}, that works of traditional art, whether Christian, Oriental or folk art, are hardly ever signed: the artist is anonymous, or if a name has survived, we know little or nothing of the man. This is true as much for literary as for plastic artifacts. In traditional arts it is never Who said? but only What was said? that concerns us: for “all that is true, by whomsoever it has been said, has its origin in the Spirit.”\textsuperscript{58}

So the first sane questions that can be asked about a work of art are, What was it for? and What does it mean? We have seen already that whatever, and however humble, the functional purpose of the work of art may have been, it had always a spiritual meaning, by no means an arbitrary meaning, but one that the function itself expresses adequately by analogy. Function and meaning cannot be forced apart; the meaning of the work of art is its intrinsic form as much as the soul is the form of the body. Meaning is even historically prior to utilitarian application. Forms such as that of the dome, arch and circle have not been “evolved,” but only applied: the circle can no more have been suggested by the wheel than a myth by a mimetic rite. The ontology of useful inventions parallels that of the world: in both “creations” the Sun is the single form of many different things; that this is actually so in the case of human production by art will be realized by everyone who is sufficiently familiar with the solar significance of almost every known type of circular or annular artifact or part of an artifact. I will only cite by way of example the eye of a needle, and remark that there is a metaphysics of embroidery and weaving, for a detailed exposition of which a whole volume might be required. It is in the same way by no accident that the Crusader’s sword was also a cross, at once the means of physical and symbol of spiritual victory. There is no traditional game or any form of athletics, nor any kind of fairy-tale properly to be so called (excepting, that is to say, those which merely reflect the fancies of individual littérateurs, a purely modern phenomenon) nor any sort of traditional jugglery, that is not at the same time an entertainment, the embodiment of a metaphysical doctrine. The meaning is literally the “spirit” of the performance or the anecdote. Iconography, in other words, is art: that art by which the actual forms of things are determined; and the final problem of research in the field of art is to understand the iconographic form of whatever composi-
tion it may be that we are studying. It is only when we have understood the *raisons d'être* of iconography that we can be said to have gone back to first principles; and that is what we mean by the “Reduction of Art to Theology.” The student understands the logic of the composition; the illiterate only its aesthetic value.

The anonymity of the artist belongs to a type of culture dominated by the longing to be liberated from oneself. All the force of this philosophy is directed against the delusion “I am the doer.” “I” am not in fact the doer, but the instrument; human individuality is not an end but only a means. The supreme achievement of individual consciousness is to lose or find (both words mean the same) itself in what is both its first beginning and its last end: “Whoever would save his psyche, let him lose it.” All that is required of the instrument is efficiency and obedience; it is not for the subject to aspire to the throne; the constitution of man is not a democracy, but the hierarchy of body, soul and spirit. Is it for the Christian to consider any work “his own,” when even Christ has said that “I do nothing of myself”? or for the Hindu, when Krishna has said that “The Comprehensor cannot form the concept ‘I am the doer’”? or the Buddhist, for whom it has been said that “To wish that it may be made known that ‘I was the author’ is the thought of a man not yet adult”? It hardly occurred to the individual artist to sign his works, unless for practical purposes of distinction; and we find the same conditions prevailing in the scarcely yet defunct community of the Shakers, who made perfection of workmanship a part of their religion, but made it a rule that works should not be signed. It is under such conditions that a really living art, unlike what Plato calls the arts of flattery, flourishes; and where the artist exploits his own personality and becomes an exhibitionist that art declines.

There is another aspect of the question that has to do with the patron rather than the artist; this too must be understood, if we are not to mistake the intentions of traditional art. It will have been observed that in traditional arts, the effigy of an individual, for whatever purpose it may have been made, is very rarely a likeness in the sense that we conceive a likeness, but much rather the representation of a type. The man is represented by his function rather than by his appearance; the effigy is of the king, the soldier, the merchant or the smith, rather than of So-and-so. The ultimate reasons for this have nothing to do with any technical inabilities or lack of the power of observation in the artist, but are hard to explain to ourselves whose pre-occupations are so different and whose faith in the eternal values of “personality” is so naive; hard to explain to ourselves, who shrink from the saying that a man must “hate” himself “if he would be My disciple.” The whole position is bound up with a traditional view
that also finds expression in the doctrine of the hereditary transmission of character and function, because of which the man can die in peace, knowing that his work will be carried on by another representative. As So-and-so, the man is reborn in his descendants, each of whom occupies in turn what was much rather an office than a person. For in what we call personality, tradition sees only a temporal function “which you hold in lease.” The very person of the king, surviving death, may be manifested in some way in some other ensemble of possibilities than these; but the royal personality descends from generation to generation, by hereditary and ritual delegation; and so we say, The king is dead, long live the king. It is the same if the man has been a merchant or craftsman; if the son to whom his personality has been transmitted is not also, for example, a blacksmith, the blacksmith of a given community, the family line is at an end; and if personal functions are not in this way transmitted from generation to generation, the social order itself has come to an end, and chaos supervenes.

We find accordingly that if an ancestral image or tomb effigy is to be set up for reasons bound up with what is rather loosely called “ancestor worship,” this image has two peculiarities, (1) it is identified as the image of the deceased by the insignia and costume of his vocation and the inscription of his name, and (2) for the rest, it is an individually indeterminate type, or what is called an “ideal” likeness. In this way both selves of the man are represented; the one that is to be inherited, and that which corresponds to an intrinsic and regenerated form that he should have built up for himself in the course of life itself, considered as a sacrificial operation terminating at death. The whole purpose of life has been that this man should realize himself in this other and essential form, in which alone the form of divinity can be thought of as adequately reflected. As St. Augustine expresses it, “This likeness begins now to be formed again in us.” It is not surprising that even in life a man would rather be represented thus, not as he is, but as he ought to be, impassibly superior to the accidents of temporal manifestation. It is characteristic of ancestral images in many parts of the East, that they cannot be recognized, except by their legends, as the portraits of individuals; there is nothing else to distinguish them from the form of the divinity to whom the spirit had been returned when the man “gave up the ghost”; almost in the same way an angelic serenity and the absence of human imperfection, and of the signs of age, are characteristic of the Christian effigy before the thirteenth century, when the study of death-masks came back into fashion and modern portraiture was born in the charnel house. The traditional image is of the man as he would be at the Resurrection, in an ageless body of glory, not as he was accidentally: “I would go down unto
Annihilation and Eternal Death, lest the Last Judgment come and find me Unannihilate, and I be seiz’d and giv’n into the hands of my own Self-hood.” Let us not forget that it is only the intellectual virtues, and by no means our individual affections, that are thought of as surviving death.

The same holds good for the heroes of epic and romance; for modern criticism, these are “unreal types” and there is no “psychological analysis.” We ought to have realized that if this is not a humanistic art, this may have been its essential virtue. We ought to have known that this was a typal art by right of long inheritance; the romance is still essentially an epic, the epic essentially a myth; and that it is just because the hero exhibits universal qualities, without individual peculiarity or limitations, that he can be a pattern imitable by every man alike in accordance with his own possibilities whatever these may be. In the last analysis the hero is always God, whose only idiosyncrasy is being, and to whom it would be absurd to attribute individual characteristics. It is only when the artist, whatever his subject may be, is chiefly concerned to exhibit himself, and when we descend to the level of the psychological novel, that the study and analysis of individuality acquires an importance. Then only portraiture in our sense takes the place of what was once an iconographic portrayal.

All these things apply only so much the more if we are to consider the deliberate portrayal of a divinity, the fundamental thesis of all traditional arts. An adequate knowledge of theology and cosmology is then indispensable to an understanding of the history of art, insofar as the actual shapes and structures of works of art are determined by their real content. Christian art, for example, begins with the representation of deity by abstract symbols, which may be geometrical, vegetable or theriomorphic, and are devoid of any sentimental appeal whatever. An anthropomorphic symbol follows, but this is still a form and not a figuration; not made as though to function biologically or as if to illustrate a text book of anatomy or of dramatic expression. Still later, the form is sentimentalized; the features of the crucified are made to exhibit human suffering, the type is completely humanized, and where we began with the shape of humanity as an analogical representation of the idea of God, we end with the portrait of the artist’s mistress posing as the Madonna and the representation of an all-too-human baby; the Christ is no longer a man-God, but the sort of man that we can approve of. With what extraordinary prescience St. Thomas Aquinas commends the use of the lower rather than the nobler forms of existence as divine symbols, “especially for those who can think of nothing nobler than bodies”.

The course of art reflects the course of thought. The artist, asserting a specious liberty, expresses himself; our age commends the man who
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thinks for himself, and therefore of himself. We can see in the hero only an imperfectly remembered historical figure, around which there have gathered mythical and miraculous accretions; the hero’s manhood interests us more than his divinity, and this applies as much to our conception of Christ or Krishna or Buddha as it does to our conceptions of Cuchullain or Sigurd or Gilgamesh. We treat the mythical elements of the story, which are its essence, as its accidents, and substitute anecdote for meaning. The secularization of art and the rationalization of religion are inseparably connected, however unaware of it we may be. It follows that for any man who can still believe in the eternal birth of any avatar (“Before Abraham was, I am”) the content of works of art cannot be a matter of indifference; the artistic humanization of the Son or of the Mother of God is as much a denial of Christian truth as any form of verbal rationalism or other heretical position. The vulgarity of humanism appears nakedly and unashamed in all euhemerism.

It is by no accident that it should have been discovered only comparatively recently that art is essentially an “aesthetic” activity. No real distinction can be drawn between aesthetic and materialistic; *aisthesis* being sensation, and matter what can be sensed. So we regard the lack of interest in anatomy as a defect of art, the absence of psychological analysis as evidence of undeveloped character; we deprecate the representation of the Bambino as a little man rather than as a child, and think of the frontality of the imagery as due to an inability to realize the three-dimensional mass of existing things; in place of the abstract light that corresponds to the gnomic aorists of the legend itself we demand the cast shadows that belong to momentary effects. We speak of a want of scientific perspective, forgetting that perspective in art is a kind of visual syntax and only a means to an end. We forget that while our perspective serves the purposes of representation in which we are primarily interested, there are other perspectives that are more intelligible and better adapted to the communicative purposes of the traditional arts.

In deprecating the secularization of art we are not confusing religion with art, but seeking to understand the content of art at different times with a view to unbiased judgment. In speaking of the decadence of art, it is really the decadence of man from intellectual to sentimental interests that we mean. For the artist’s skill may remain the same throughout: he is able to do what he intends. It is the mental image to which he works that changes: that “art has fixed ends” is no longer true as soon as we know what we like instead of liking what we know. Our point is that without an understanding of the change, the integrity of even a supposedly objective historical study is destroyed; we judge the traditional works, not by their
actual accomplishment, but by our own intentions, and so inevitably come to believe in a progress of art, as we do in the progress of man.

Ignorant of the traditional philosophy and of its formulae we often think of the artist as having been trying to do just what he may have been consciously avoiding. For example, if Damascene says that Christ from the moment of his conception possessed a “rational and intellectual soul,”71 if as St. Thomas Aquinas says “his body was perfectly formed and assumed in the first instant,”72 if the Buddha is said to have spoken in the womb, and to have taken seven strides at birth, from one end to the other of the universe, could the artist have intended to represent either of the newborn children as a puling infant? If we are disturbed by what we call the “vacancy” of a Buddha’s expression, ought we not to bear in mind that he is thought of as the Eye in the World, the impassible spectator of things as they really are, and that it would have been impertinent to have given him features molded by human curiosity or passion? If it was an artistic canon that veins and bones should not be made apparent, can we blame the Indian artist as an artist for not displaying such a knowledge of anatomy as might have evoked our admiration? If we know from authoritative literary sources that the lotus on which the Buddha sits or stands is not a botanical specimen, but the universal ground of existence inflorescent in the waters of its indefinite possibilities, how inappropriate it would have been to represent him in the solid flesh precariously balanced on the surface of a real and fragile flower! The same considerations will apply to all our reading of mythology and fairy tale, and to all our judgments of primitive, savage or folk art: the anthropologist whose interest is in a culture is a better historian of such arts than is the critic whose only interest is in the aesthetic surfaces of the artifacts themselves.

In the traditional philosophy, as we cannot too often repeat, “art has to do with cognition”;73 beauty is the attractive power of a perfect expression. This we can only judge and only really enjoy as an “intelligible good, which is the good of reason”74 if we have really known what it was that was to be expressed. If sophistry be “ornament more than is appropriate to the thesis of the work,”75 can we judge of what is or is not sophistry if we ourselves remain indifferent to this content? Evidently not. One might as well attempt the study of Christian or Buddhist art without a knowledge of the corresponding philosophies as attempt the study of a mathematical papyrus without the knowledge of mathematics.
Let us conclude with a discussion of the problems of voluntary poverty and of iconoclasm. In cultures molded by the traditional philosophy we find that two contrasting positions are maintained, either at any one time or alternately: the work of art, both as a utility and in its significance is on the one hand a good, and on the other an evil.

The ideal of voluntary poverty, which rejects utilities, can be readily understood. It is easy to see that an indefinite multiplication of utilities, the means of life, may end in an identification of culture with comfort, and the substitution of means for ends; to multiply wants is to multiply man’s servitude to his own machinery. I do not say that this has not already taken place. On the other hand, the man is most self-sufficient, autochthonous and free who is least dependent upon possessions. We all recognize to some extent the value of living simply. But the question of possessions is a matter relative to the individual’s vocation; the workman needs his tools and the soldier his weapons, but the contemplative is the nearer to his goal the fewer his needs. It was not until after the Fall that Adam and Eve had occasion to practice the tailor’s art: they had no images of a God with whom they daily conversed. The angels, also, “have fewer ideas and useless means than men.” Possessions are a necessity to the extent that we can use them; it is altogether legitimate to enjoy what we do use, but equally inordinate to enjoy what we cannot use or to use what cannot be enjoyed. All possessions not at the same time beautiful and useful are an affront to human dignity. Ours is perhaps the first society to find it natural that some things should be beautiful and others useful. To be voluntarily poor is to have rejected what we cannot both admire and use; this definition can be applied alike to the case of the millionaire and to that of the monk.

The reference of iconoclasm is more particularly to the use of images as supports of contemplation. The same rule will apply. There are those, the great majority, whose contemplation requires such supports, and others, the minority, whose vision of God is immediate. For the latter to think of God in terms of any verbal or visual concept would be the same as to forget him. We cannot make one rule apply to both cases. The professional iconoclast is such either because he does not understand the nature of images and rites, or because he does not trust the understanding of those who practice iconolatry or follow rites. To call the other man an idolater or superstitious is, generally speaking, only a manner of asserting our own superiority. Idolatry is the misuse of symbols, a definition needing no further qualifications. The traditional philosophy has nothing to say against the use of symbols and rites; though there is much that the most
orthodox can have to say against their misuse. It may be emphasized that the danger of treating verbal formulae as absolutes is generally greater than that of misusing plastic images.

We shall consider only the use of symbols, and their rejection when their utility is at an end. A clear understanding of the principles involved is absolutely necessary if we are not to be confused by the iconoclastic controversies that play so large a part in the histories of every art. It is inasmuch as he “knows immortal things by the mortal” that the man as a veritable person is distinguished from the human animal, who knows only the things as they are in themselves and is guided only by this estimative knowledge. The unmanifested can be known by analogy; His silence by His utterance. That “the invisible things of Him” can be seen through “the things which are made” will apply not only to God’s works but also to things made by hands, if they have been made by such an art as we have tried to describe: “In these outlines, my son, I have drawn a likeness of God for you, as far as that is possible; and if you gaze upon this likeness with the eyes of your heart . . . the sight itself will guide you on your way.”78 This point of view Christianity inherited from Neoplatonism: and therefore, as Dante says, “doth the Scripture condescend to your capacity, assigning foot and hand to God, with other meaning.” We have no other language whatever except the symbolic in which to speak of ultimate reality: the only alternative is silence; in the meantime, “The ray of divine revelation is not extinguished by the sensible imagery wherewith it is veiled.”79

“Revelation” itself implies a veiling rather than a disclosure: a symbol is a “mystery.”80 “Half reveal and half conceal” fitly describes the parabolic style of the scriptures and of all conceptual images of being in itself, which cannot disclose itself to our physical senses. Because of this Augustine could say that in the last analysis “All scripture is vain.” For “If any one in seeing God conceives something in his mind, this is not God, but one of God’s effects”:81 “We have no means for considering how God is, but rather how he is not”;82 there are “things which our intellect cannot behold . . . we cannot understand what they are except by denying things of them.”83 Dicta to this effect could be cited from innumerable sources, both Christian and Oriental.

It does not follow that the spiritual tradition is at war with itself with respect to the use of conceptual images. The controversy that plays so large a part in the history of art is maintained only by human partisans of limited points of view. As we said before, the question is really one of utility only: it parallels that of works and faith. Conceptual images and works alike, art and prudence equally, are means that must not be mistaken for ends; the end is one of beatific contemplation, not requiring any operation. One who proposes to cross a river needs a boat; “but let him no longer use the Law
as a means of arrival when he has arrived.” Religious art is simply a visual theology: Christian and Oriental theology alike are means to an end, but not to be confused with the end. Both alike involve a dual method, that of the *via affirmativa* and of the *via negativa*; on the one hand affirming things of God by way of praise, and on the other denying every one of these limiting descriptive affirmations, for though the worship is dispositive to immediate vision, God is not and never can be “what men worship here.” The two ways are far from mutually exclusive; they are complementary. Because they are so well known to the student of Christian theology I shall only cite from an Upanishad, where it is a question of the use of certain types of concepts of deity regarded as supports of contemplation. Which of these is the best? That depends upon individual faculties. But in any case, these are pre-eminent aspects of the incorporeal deity; “These one should contemplate and praise, but then deny. For with these one rises from higher to higher states of being. But when all these forms are resolved, then he attains to the unity of the Person.”

To resume: the normal view of art that we have described above, starting from the position that “Though he is an artist, the artist is nevertheless a man,” is not the private property of any philosopher, or time, or place: we can only say that there are certain times, and notably our own, at which it has been forgotten. We have emphasized that art is for the man, and not the man for art: that whatever is made only to give pleasure is a luxury and that the love of art under these conditions becomes a mortal sin; that in traditional art function and meaning are inseparable goods; that it holds in both respects that there can be no good use without art; and that all good uses involve the corresponding pleasures. We have shown that the traditional artist is not expressing himself, but a thesis: that it is in this sense that both human and divine art are expressions, but only to be spoken of as “self expressions” if it has been clearly understood what “self” is meant. We have shown that the traditional artist is normally anonymous, the individual as such being only the instrument of the “self” that finds expression. We have shown that art is essentially symbolic, and only accidentally illustrative or historical; and finally that art, even the highest, is only the means to an end, that even the scriptural art is only a manner of “seeing through a glass, darkly,” and that although this is far better than not to see at all, the utility of iconography must come to an end when vision is “face to face.”
NOTES


2 *Ars nihil quod recta ratio factibilium.* Omnis applicatio rationis rectae ad aliquid factibile pertinet ad artem; sed ad prudentiam non pertinet nisi applicatio rationis rectae ad ca de quibuis est consilium. Prudentia est recta ratio agibilium. (St. Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.* I-II.57.5; II-II.47.2; IV.3.7 and 8. Aristotle *Ethic.* VI.5).


5 St. Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.* I-II.57.5; II-II.21.2 ad 2; 47.8; 167.2; and 16q. 2 ad 4.

6 *Ibid.* I.91.3; and I-II.57.3 ad 2 (“It is evident that a craftsman is inclined by justice, which rectifies his will, to do his work faithfully”).


9 *Bhagavad Gîtâ*, XVIII.45-46, *sve sve karmany-abhiratah samsiddham labhate narah*, etc. “And if man takes upon him in all its fullness the proper office of his own vocation (*curam propriam diligentiae suae*), it is brought about that both he and the world are the means of right order to one another. . . . For since the world is God’s handiwork, he who maintains and heightens its beauty by his tendance (*diligentia*) is cooperating with the will of God, when he by the aid of his bodily strength, and by his work and his administration (*opere curaque*) composes any figure that he forms in accordance with the divine intention (*cum speciem, quam ille intentione formavit . . . componit*). What shall be his reward? . . . that when we are retired from office (*emeritos*) . . . God will restore us to the nature of our better part, that is divine” (Hermetica, Asclepius, I.10, 12). In this magnificent definition of the artist’s function, it may be noted that *cura propria* corresponds to the *svakarma* of the *Bhagavad Gîtâ*, and that *diligentia* (from *diligo*, to love) becomes “tendance in precisely the same way that *ratah* (from *ram*, to take delight in) becomes “intent upon” or “devoted to.” It is the man who while at work is doing what he likes best that can be called “cultured.”

10 *Nec oportet, si liberales artes sunt nobiliores, quod magis eis conveniat ratio artis* (St. Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.* I-II.57.3 ad 3). “The productions of all arts are kinds of poetry and their craftsmen are all poets” (Plato, *Symposium*, 205C).

11 Plato, *Gorgias*, 503. In Rigveda IX.112 the work of the carpenter, doctor, fletcher and sacrificial priest are all alike treated as ritual “operations,” or “rites” (*vrata*).

12 *Analects*, III.25.

13 Plato, *Cratylus*, 416C; Dionysius Areopagiticus, *De div. nom.* IV.5; Ulrich of Strassburg, *De pulchro*; *Lantkâvatâra Sûtra*, II.118-9, etc.
14 *Ens et bonum convertuntur.*

15 Witelo, *Perspectiva*, IV.148-9. Baeumker, *Witelo*, p. 639, fails to see that Witelo’s recognition of the subjectivity of *taste* in no way contradicts his enunciation of the objectivity of *beauty*. Taste is a matter of the affections; beauty one of judgment, which is “the perfection of art” (St. Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.* II-II.47.8.), where there is no room for preferences, art being comparable to science in its certainty, and differing from science only in being ordered to operation.


17 Said by the Parisian Master Jean Mignot in connection with the building of the cathedral of Milan in 1398, in answer to the opinion *scientia est unum et ars aliud. Scientia reddit opus pulchrum.* St. Bonaventura, *De reductione artium ad theologiam* 13. *Nam qui canil quod non sapil, diffinitur bestia. . . . Non verum facil ars cantorem, sed documentum*, Guido d’Arezzo. The actual distinction of science from art is drawn by St. Thomas Aquinas in *Sum. Theol.* I.14.8 and I-II.57.3 ad 3: both have to do with cognition, but whereas science has in view a knowledge only, art is ordered to an external operation. It will be seen that the greater part of modern science is what the medieval philosopher would have called an art, the engineer, for example, being essentially an artist, despite the fact that “without science art would be nothing”—but guesswork. “The antithesis between science and art is a false one, maintained only by the incurably, if enjoyably, sentimental” (Professor Crane Brinton, in *The American Scholar*, 1938, p. 152).


19 Boethius, *De consol.* I.6.45.

20 Matt. 4:4.

21 Dante, *Ep. ad Can. Grand.* 15, 16: “The whole work was undertaken not for a speculative but a practical end. The purpose of the whole is to remove those who are living in this life from the state of wretchedness and to lead them to the state of blessedness.” Ashvaghosha, *Saundarananda*, colophon: “This poem, pregnant with the burden of Liberation, has been composed by me in the poetic manner, not for the sake of giving pleasure, but for the sake of giving peace, and to win over other-minded hearers. If I have dealt in it with subjects other than that of Liberation, that pertains to what is proper to poetry, to make it tasty, just as when honey is mixed with a sour medicinal herb to make it drinkable. Since I beheld the world for the most part given over to objects of sense and disliking to consider Liberation, I have spoken here of the Principle in the garb of poetry, holding that Liberation is the primary value. Whoever understands this, let him retain what is set forth, and not the play of fancy, just as only the gold is cared for when it has been separated from the ore and dross.” “Dante and Milton claimed to be didactic; we consider the claim a curious weakness in masters of style whose true but unconscious mission was to regale us with ‘aesthetic emotion’” (Walter Shewring in *Integration*, II. 2, Oct. -Nov., 1938, p. 11).

Dante’s “practical purpose” is precisely what Guido d’Arezzo means by *usus* in the lines,
That is “Between the ‘virtuosi’ and the ‘singers’ the difference is very great: the former merely vocalize, the latter understand the music’s composition. He who sings of what he savors not is termed a ‘brute’; no ‘brute’ is he who sings, not merely artfully, but usefully; it is not art alone, but the theme that makes the real ‘singer’.”

Professor Lang, in his *Music and Western Civilization*, p. 87, misunderstands the penultimate line, which he renders by “A brute by rote and not by art produces melody,” a version that ignores the double negative and misinterprets *usu*, which is not “by habit” but “usefully” or “profitably,” *ôphélimôs*. The thought is like St. Augustine’s, “not to enjoy what we should use,” and Plato’s, for whom the Muses are given us “that we may use them intellectually (*metà noû*), not as a source of irrational pleasure (*ephèdonên á'logan*) but as an aid to the revolution of the soul within us, of which the harmony was lost at birth, to help in restoring it to order and consent with its Self” (*Timaeus* 47D, cf. 90D). The words *sciunt quae componit musica* are reminiscent of Quintillian’s *Docti rationem componendi intelligunt, etiam indocti voluptatem* (IX.4.116), based on and almost a literal translation of Plato, *Timaeus* 80B. *Sapit*, as in *sapientia*, “scientia cum amore.”

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22 *Aitareya Áranyaka*, II.3.2; *Aitareya Brâhmana*, VII.10; *Katha Upanishad*, II.10b.

23 Rom. 1:20. Aquinas repeatedly compares the human and divine architects: God’s knowledge is to his creation as is the artist’s knowledge of art to the things made by art (*Sum. Theol. I*.I.4.8; I.17.1; I.22.2; I.45.6; I-II.13.2 ad 3).


26 Keith, A. B., *Aitareya Áranyaka*, p. 42. “The first principle of democracy . . . is that no one knows the final truth about anything” (W. H. Auden, in the *Nation*, March 25, 1939, p. 353). “For there is a rancor that is contemptuous of immortality, and will not let us recognize what is divine in us” (Hermetica, *Asclepius*, I.12 b).

27 “To make the primordial truth intelligible, to make the unheard audible, to enunciate the primordial word, to represent the archetype, such is the task of art, or it is not art” (Andrae, W., “Keramik im Dienste der Weisheit” in *Berichte de Deutschen Keramischen Gesellschaft*, XVII, Dec., 1936, p. 623): but “The sensible forms, in which there was at first a polar balance of the physical and metaphysical, have been more and more voided of content on their way down to us, and so we say ‘This is an ornament’” (Andrae, W., *Die ionische Saüle, Bauform oder Symbol?* 1933, p. 65).
28 St. Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.*, I.5.4: St. Basil, *De Spir. Sanct.* XVIII. 45. “The first perfection of a thing consists in its very form, from which it receives its species” (St. Thomas Aquinas, *ibid.* III.29.2c). The form that is the perfection of the thing (its exemplary form) is the standard by which the actual form of the thing itself is judged: in other words, it is by their ideas that we know what things ought to be like (St. Augustine, *De Trin.*, IX.6,11), and not by any observation or collection of already existing things. Our authors commonly speak of the arch as an illustration of an exemplary form; thus St. Augustine, *ibid.*, and St. Bonaventura, *II Sent.*, d.1, p. 11, a.1, q ad 3, 4, *Agens per intellectum producit per formas, quae sunt aliquid rei, sed idea in mente sicut artifex producit arcam.*

29 Natura naturans, Creatrix Universalis, Deus, from whom all natured things derive their specific aspect.

30 “The perfect Word, not wanting in anything, and, so to speak, the art of God” (St. Augustine, *De Trin.* VI.10). “Der sun ist ein verstentnisse des vaters und ist bildner (architect) aller dinge in sinem vater” (Eckhart, Pfeiffer, p. 391). “Through him all things were made” (John 1:3).

31 *Omnes enim rationes exemplares concipuntur ab aeterno in vulva aeternae sapientiae seu utero*, St. Bonaventura, *In Hexaem*, coll, 20, n.5. The conception of an imitable form is a “vital operation,” that is to say, a generation.


34 Sankarâcârya, *Svâtmanirûpana*, 95. On the world-picture as an actual form see Vimuktatman, as cited by Dasgupta, *History of Indian Philosophy*, II.203. The perfection of judgment is represented in Genesis 1:31, “God saw everything that he had made, and behold it was very good.” This judgment can only have been with respect to the ideal pattern pre-existent in the divine intellect, not with reference to any external standard.


36 St. Augustine, *De Trin.* IX.6, 11; see Gilson, *Introduction à l’étude de St. Augustin.*, 1931, p. 121.

37 William Blake.

38 Plato, *Republic*, 500E.


40 For St. Bonaventura’s “expressionism” see Bissen *loc. cit.*, pp. 92-93.

41 Every mimetic rite is by nature a work of art; in the traditional philosophy of art the artist’s operation is also always a rite, and thus essentially a religious activity.

42 Meister Eckhart.
Formulations

43 St. Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.*, II-II.47.4 ad 2.
45 Since in this case “Diu künste sint meister in dem meister” (Eckhart, Pfeiffer, p. 390).
46 St. Bonaventura *I Sent.*, d.36, a.2q.1 ad 4 citing St. Augustine, *res factae . . . in artifice creato dicuntur vivere*.
47 St. Augustine, *Enarratio in Ps. XXXII*: cf. in Ps. CXLVI *Vis ergo psallere? Non solum vox tua sonet laudes Dei, sed opera tua concordent cum voce tua*. It is by no means necessary to exclude from “opera” here whatever is made *per artem et ex voluntate*.
49 *Asclepius*, *Enneads*, IV.4.2.
50 Purgatorio, XXIV. 52-54. “In the making of things by art, do we not know that a man who has this God for his leader achieves a brilliant success, whereas he on whom Love has laid no hold is obscure?” (Plato, *Symposium*, 197A). “My doctrine is not mine, but his that sent me. . . . He that speaketh of himself seeketh his own glory,” John 7:16, 18.
51 *Aitareya Brâhmana*, VI.27. Cf. *Sâñkhâyana Âranyaka*, VIII.9. “There is this celestial harp: this human harp is a likeness of it.”
52 Exodus, 25:40.
53 *Aitareya Brâhmana*, VI.27. Cf. *Sâñkhâyana Âranyaka*, VIII.9. “There is this celestial harp: this human harp is a likeness of it.”
54 Plotinus, *Enneads*, V.9.11. The builder and carpenter are then doing the will of God “on earth as it is done in heaven.”
55 Conf. XI.5.
56 “As regards the most lordly part of our soul, we must conceive of it in this wise: we declare that God has given to each of us, as his daemon, that kind of soul which is housed in the top of our body and which raises us—seeing that we are not an earthly but a heavenly plant—up from earth towards our kindred in heaven” (Plato, *Timaeus*, 90A).
57 “The artist in Viking times is not to be thought of as an individual, as would be the case today. . . . It is a creative art” (Strzygowski, *Early Church Art in Northern Europe*, 1928, pp. 159-160): “It is in the very nature of Medieval Art that very few names of artists have been transmitted to us. . . . The entire mania for connecting the few names preserved by tradition with well-known masterpieces,—all this is characteristic of the nineteenth century’s cult of individualism, based upon ideals of the Renaissance” (H. Swarzenski, in *Journal of the Walters Art Gallery*, I, 1938, p. 55). “The academic styles that have succeeded each other since the seventeenth century, as a consequence of this curious divorce of beauty from truth, can hardly be classified as Christian art, since they recognize no inspiration higher than the human mind” (C. R. Morey, *Christian Art*, 1935).
57a Plato, Republic, 342BC.
58 St. Ambrose on 1 Cor. 12:3, cited by St. Thomas Aquinas, Sum. Theol., I-II.109.1 ad 1.
59 The title of a work by St. Bonaventura.
60 Quintillian, IX.4.
61 Luke, 17:33. Hence the repeated question of the Upanishads, “By which self is the summum bonum attainable?” and the traditional “Know thyself.”
62 John, 8:28.
63 Bhagavad Gîtâ, III.27; V.8. Cf. Jaiminiya Upanishad Brâhmana, I.5.2; Udâna 70.
64 Dhammapada, 74.
65 E. D. and F. Andrews, Shaker Furniture, 1937, p.44.
66 See Jitta-Zadoks, Ancestral Portraiture in Rome, 1932, pp. 87, 92 f. Tomb effigies about 1200 “represented the deceased not as he actually appeared after death but as he hoped and trusted to be on the Day of Judgment. This is apparent in the pure and happy expression of all the equally youthful and equally beautiful faces, which have lost every trace of individuality. But towards the end of the XIIIth . . . century not how they perhaps appear one day but how they had actually been in life was considered important. . . . As the last consequence of this demand for exact likeness the death mask, taken from the actual features, made its appearance . . . rationalism and realism appearing at the same time.” Cf. my Transformation of Nature in Art, p. 91 and note 64, and “The traditional conception of ideal portraiture,” Twice a Year, No. 3/4 (Autumn, 1939).
68 De spiritu et littera, 37.
69 Sum. Theol., I.1.9.
70 John 8:58. Cf. Bhagavad Gîtâ, IV.1, 4, 5; Saddharma Pundarîka, XIV.44 and XV.1.
71 De fid. orthod. III.
72 Sum. Theol., III.33.1.
73 Ibid. I.5.4 ad 1.
74 Ibid. I–II.30.1c. Cf. Witelo, Lib. de intelligentiis, XVIII, XIX.
75 St. Augustine, De doc. christ., II.31.
76 Eckhart.
77 Plotinus, Enneads, IV.4.6, “In other words, they have seen God and they do not remember? Ah, no: it is that they see God still and always, and that as long as they see, they cannot tell themselves they have had the vision; such reminiscence is for souls that have lost it.” Nicolas of Cusa, De vis. Dei, Ch. XVI: “What satisfies the intellect is not what it understands.” Kena Upanishad, 30, “The thought of God is his by whom it is unthought, or if he thinks the thought, it is that he does not understand.” Vajracchedika Sutra, f. 38 XXVI, “Those who see me in any form, or think of me in words, their way of thinking is false, they do not see me at all. The Beneficent Ones are to be seen in the Law, theirs is a Law-body: the Buddha is
rightly to be understood as being of the nature of the Law, he cannot be understood by any means.”

78 Hermetica, Lib. IV.11b.


80 Clement of Alexandria, Protr. II.15. Cf. René Guénon, “Mythes, Mystères et Symboles,” in Voile d’Isis (Études Traditionelles) 40, 1935. That “revelation” means a “displaying” depends upon the fact that an exhibition of the principle in a likeness, and as it were clothed in the veil of analogy, though it is not an exhibition of the principle in its naked essence, is relatively to what would otherwise be the obscurity of a total ignorance, a true “demonstration.”

81 St. Thomas Aquinas, Sum. Theol., III.92.1 ad 4.

82 Ibid. I.3.1. Cf. Brhadâranyaka Upanishad, IVA.22; Maitri Upanishad IV.5, etc.


84 Parable of the raft, Majjhima Nikâya, I.135; St. Augustine, De spir. et lit., 16.

85 Kena Upanishad, 2-8.

86 Maitri Upanishad, IV.5.

87 For the conditions under which ornamentation becomes a sin, see St. Thomas Aquinas, Sum. Theol., II–II.167.2 and 169.2 ad 4. Cf. my “On the relation of beauty to truth” in Art Bulletin, XX, pp. 72-77, and “Ornament,” d. XXI.

88 I Cor. 13:12.